It’s time for Berlin to step up to the plate on Israel sanctions, beyond Ben-Gvir

Sanctions against ministers who openly describe themselves as fascists, fuel war crimes, and dehumanise entire populations should hardly be controversial.

They should have passed long before Israeli national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s recent call for a daily “KPI” of killing 30 to 40 Palestinians, in business terms.

Yet, some governments have long remained hesitant, including Germany and the Czech Republic.

Calls for sanctions have come from across centrist parties, and the government has sharply criticised Ben-Gvir’s dehumanising rhetoric. Yet Berlin has fallen short of openly supporting sanctions.

In the past, the government argued that such measures could strengthen Israel’s rightwing parties during their election campaign.

There are good reasons to question that assumption. Indeed, Israelis, from the left to the centre-right, are concerned about their country’s international isolation.

According to the Mitvim Institute’s Foreign Policy Index , 66 percent of Israelis fear that their country is developing into a pariah state, while 58 percent attach great importance to remaining in the West’s liberal-democratic camp.

EU sanctions against individual cabinet members could reinforce awareness of the international costs of Israel’s current political trajectory, and could deter centre-right voters who are eyeing voting for Otzma Yehudit or Religious Zionism.

By contrast, Israelis who support Ben-Gvir or Smotrich are less concerned about European opinion. In the same survey, 60 percent of ultra-Orthodox and Otzma Yehudit voters said they did not consider Israel’s place in the Western world important.

Sanctions may reinforce existing preferences, but there is little evidence that they would affect how this group votes. Hence, the assumption that sanctions would necessarily drive voters to the far-right is unconvincing.

Israel’s political trajectory cannot be reduced to Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. Over the past decade, ideas that had previously remained within Israel’s political fringes have become mainstream.

Netanyahu’s 2022 coalition with extreme parties helped this normalisation. As a result, settlement expansion and creeping annexation have accelerated, while the political space for Palestinian statehood continues to shrink.

This approach is hardly questioned across Israel’s political elites.

As justified as the debate over individual sanctions may be, it does not go far enough. The EU must target the underlying structures and broader Israeli government in response to Israel’s current trajectory.

The upcoming Knesset elections are not a reason to wait for the EU to deploy far-reaching measures either. Even a change in government may not produce the policy changes Europeans hope for.

Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar party -currently leading the polls, opposes Palestinian statehood and the “two-state solution” and supports Israel’s illegal settlements in the West Bank.

Hence, a new government might change Israel’s tone and its relationship with Europe without reversing any policies that have driven the current crises. Waiting for elections before exerting pressure therefore simply becomes an argument for indefinite delay.

Berlin has opposed measures including restrictions on settlement products, sanctions against organisations financing settlement expansion, and broader trade-related measures.

Policymakers referenced Germany’s “Staatsräson” - the commitment to Israel’s security arising from Germany’s responsibility for the Holocaust - to justify Berlin’s principled opposition. In practice, the term has increasingly meant unconditional support for the Israeli government, even when it became unclear whether such support guaranteed Israel’s long-term security. The past two years have hardly brought Israel closer to sustainable peace, or, with it, genuine security.

Indeed, Berlin is not alone: the Czech Republic, Italy, and Hungary have opposed various measures. But Germany’s population size, economic weight, and political influence make its position consequential.

Trade-related provisions in the EU-Israel Association Agreement can be suspended by qualified majority.

Here, Germany’s support could have moved the Council across the required threshold of 55 percent member states agreeing, representing 65 percent of the population.

On measures requiring unanimity, every member state holds a de facto veto.

But Germany can also influence other reluctant governments: when the EU debated sanctions against violent Israeli settlers, Germany initially hesitated and agreed only after measures against Hamas members had also been set in motion; the Czech Republic and Hungary dropped their opposition soon after.

The significance of a German policy shift therefore goes far beyond Ben-Gvir.

As Israel’s largest trading partner, the EU has substantial economic leverage over Israel but has repeatedly failed to translate it into political pressure. At a minimum, the EU should target the economic structures sustaining settlement expansion, including by preventing settlement products from benefiting from access to the single market and sanctioning organisations that finance or facilitate expansion.

The real test of Germany’s changing position is therefore not whether Berlin ultimately agrees to sanction one or two extremist ministers.

Such sanctions would matter, both materially and symbolically. But there is a danger that they will be presented as evidence of a fundamental shift in European policy while leaving its substance largely unchanged.

Sanctions against Ben-Gvir and his extremist allies are overdue. They should be the beginning of a broader European policy shift, not a substitute for one.

The more consequential question is whether Germany and the EU are finally prepared to use their economic and political leverage against the structures enabling settlement expansion and the steady erosion of prospects for Palestinian statehood.

Nele Anders is a senior advocacy officer at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).