Russia denies fresh mobilisation plans as analysts warn of post-election call-up and citizens research how to leave the country (Ukraine Battlefield update, Day 1,617)

Everyone is talking about it, but Moscow insists it will not happen: Russian propagandists deny that mobilisation is being planned.

Everyone is talking about it, but Moscow insists it will not happen. When the Kremlin denies something, it is especially worth paying attention. It lied when it said it would not occupy Crimea; it lied when it claimed it would not launch a full-scale war against Ukraine; and it lied when it denied poisoning Alexei Navalny, starting the war in Donbas, or shooting down flight MH17 with 298 people on board.

One of Russia’s most aggressively anti-Western politicians, former prime minister and president Dmitry Medvedev, felt compelled to deny reports of a new mobilisation. According to independent Russian media, it could begin as early as autumn, immediately after the Duma so-called elections.

According to the deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, these are all rumours and a paid propaganda campaign aimed at destabilising the situation in the country. Russia, unlike Ukraine, allegedly has enough soldiers. He said that around 200,000 people signed contracts with the defence ministry in the first half of this year.

Russians apparently do not see it that way and have therefore begun googling more than at any time since the start of the full-scale war, including where they can travel without visas and how quickly they can obtain a passport, as the independent Russian channel Mozhem Obyasnit found . In July, it said, Moscow residents also began complaining en masse that they were unable to obtain passports because of a lack of available appointments.

As German economist Janis Kluge explained for the website Vazhnyye Istorii , between 800 and 1,000 people a day signed contracts with the defence ministry in the first quarter of this year, a decline of up to 20 percent compared with the same period last year. The following Viorstka chart also clearly shows the decline in recruitment:

For example, it shows that Moscow sent 1,708 contract soldiers to the front in April and 1,378 in May. “That is 1,000 fewer than last year and comparable with figures for 2024, when the capital had not yet introduced million-rouble payments for contracts with the defence ministry,” the Russian website wrote .

The fact is that for several months, the Russian army has been advancing very slowly at the cost of enormous losses, which it cannot replace through recruitment. The pool of people willing to enter the “meat grinder” in exchange for generous contracts has gradually been exhausted. Moreover, burning Russian tankers, refineries and Wildberries warehouses deep inside Russian territory not only seriously threatens the image of the Russian regime, but above all drains its war budget.

Military analysts consulted by the Russian website Current Time assessed the slow Russian summer offensive, focused mainly around three cities, Kostiantynivka, Lyman and Dobropillia, as follows: since the beginning of the year, both sides have gained roughly the same amount of territory, 700 square kilometres.

With an estimated 450,000 dead and 1.4 million wounded, declining volunteer recruitment, and Russian forces making only incremental territorial gains, a new army is needed, analyst Julia Davis wrote . She also recalled the words of propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, who is likewise irritated by rumours about mobilisation. “Everyone is talking about ‘mobilisation, mobilisation’,” Solovyov said recently, calling for so-called Z-bloggers to be prosecuted for spreading panic.

It is almost inevitable, both a Russian and a German analyst said. Several independent Russian media outlets, including Meduza and Vazhnyye Istorii , reported as early as June, citing sources close to the Kremlin and security services, that something was being prepared for autumn.

The final decision on whether and how a new mobilisation would take place has not yet been made.

According to Russian analyst and historian Sergei Lukashevsky, there is a very high probability that limited mobilisation will begin after the “electoral event”, the September 2026 State Duma elections. “I would even venture to say that it is almost inevitable,” he told Denník N.

Austrian military expert Gustav Gressel sees it similarly. “It appears to be approaching. Extensive secret preparations are underway,” he told Denník N.

As ISW wrote in its latest report , this will be a highly personal decision for Vladimir Putin, also dependent on his ability to assess the situation on the battlefield realistically. Mobilisation carries numerous risks, including a new wave of mass emigration and a further decline in the president’s popularity. Putin has sought to distance himself as much as possible from the failures of the “special military operation”.

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky also spoke about Russian mobilisation a few days ago, based on information from Ukraine’s own intelligence services. In an interview with Sky News, he said that Putin would be planning to mobilise between 300,000 and 500,000 men. However, he would not be able to train them quickly or properly, meaning that high Russian losses would continue, Zelensky said.

German military analyst Julius Röpcke, who wrote for Bild for many years, argued that such figures are realistic.

According to him, Russia might also try to follow Ukraine’s approach, in which drones are increasingly replacing manpower, or establish more strike centres with ballistic missiles. If that failed, however, the mobilisation mentioned above could be considered. He estimated that it would take six months before its effects became apparent at the front.

According to Lukashevsky, the main problem with the Kremlin’s system for recruiting contract soldiers is not that the number of new recruits has begun to decline slightly, but the quality of the available human resources. Increasingly, contracts are being signed by older people with low social and professional status, often including convicted criminals.

“In 2025, 44 percent of confirmed Russian military deaths were men aged between 45 and 55,” Lukashevsky said, a claim also supported by Viorstka. Many newly recruited soldiers are unfit for combat.

“They are criminals, and they are already so old and sick that they can barely stand on their feet. They are people who hang around bars and, until recently, were sleeping on the streets. They are a burden to everyone. What can they be trained to do? They cannot even wear uniforms; they can barely carry 20 kg. They are single-use,” the website quoted a military source as saying.

Moreover, according to Lukashevsky, the weakest point of today’s Russian army is not its infantry, but its drone-operating forces. As he added, attempts to recruit university students into contract service have largely failed .

“Meanwhile, the list of Ukrainian drone targets continues to expand and now includes logistics hubs and cargo vessels. Ordinary riflemen are among the least effective means of defending against drones, yet even this basic level of protection cannot be provided for all vulnerable sites,” the Russian expert said.

According to Viorstka, the elite Rubicon drone unit is also facing problems recruiting personnel for more demanding roles.

Lukashevsky predicts that, given public unease, this would be a partial and gradual mobilisation. Such a move would not require an extensive campaign, he said. “Since September 2022, the authorities have carried out extensive preparatory work. It is certainly possible that the new electronic registers will reveal serious problems once they are put into operation, but that may not be the case. It appears that, at least, the Kremlin believes everything is ready,” he said.

As ISW noted, Putin had already, at the end of last year, “signed a law changing the administrative process of Russian military conscription to a year-round cycle instead of the previous biannual cycles, thereby significantly increasing the rate at which Russia could summon and process larger numbers of conscripts and reservists”.

What could happen “after the elections”? The Kremlin is laying the groundwork through several measures for a mobilisation that could take place in a hybrid or undeclared form.

The Russian website Viorstka compiled a list of unpopular measures that officials, experts and the Russian public fear could follow the elections:

The website quoted two political strategists working with the Kremlin who support this option, saying that “some security officials have long believed that we must stop grovelling” to the population and “fight with the whole country”. A failure at the front or in recruiting soldiers could serve as a trigger. As it noted, martial law is already in force in four occupied parts of Ukraine.

Efforts to encourage people to fight against Ukraine are also reflected in the increase in the payment from two million roubles to 2.9 million in the Novosibirsk region, where recruitment is not progressing at the pace demanded from above. “We have one of the lowest numbers of contracts in the country. They made it clear that if we do not submit the required figures by August, something drastic will happen,” Viorstka quoted a source in the regional government as saying, adding that there was a shortage of money and allegedly even uniforms.

Seizure of deposits. There is speculation about the confiscation of citizens’ savings, for example through their forced conversion into war bonds. Both the finance minister and the central bank governor have denied this.

Could it work? Experts are sceptical. Austrian expert Gustav Gressel doubts whether mobilisation would solve Russia’s problems on the battlefield. “From an operational perspective, the Russians have not yet found a way of turning larger numbers of people into greater progress,” he said.

“Killing all those poor souls will be difficult. Will they open new avenues of advance in order to overwhelm the Ukrainian defenders? Yes. But I do not think it will work,” he said. At the same time, he said, it can be assumed that ballistic strikes will play an important role in attacks on cities and that the coming winter will be even harder than the last.

According to Gressel, Moscow will seek to secure Ukraine’s capitulation through such a combined assault, but will not succeed.

As Lukashevsky pointed out, mobilisation is not merely a matter of replenishing military ranks. “For Putin, it represents a fundamental strategic crossroads. The war has reached a stalemate,” the Russian historian said. Russia still has the upper hand on the battlefield, but it may have lost, probably for the first time in its history, its greatest strategic advantage: a secure strategic rear.

“Hitler reached Moscow and Stalingrad, but he could not bomb Saratov, Kazan or Nizhny Novgorod. Ukraine can do that today. Ukrainian drones have reached as far as Tyumen and Omsk. Oil and gas facilities in western Siberia are further potential targets,” Lukashevsky said.

As he noted, Russia has historically often been vulnerable at its borders and during offensive campaigns, from Peter the Great’s defeat at Narva, through Tukhachevsky’s defeat near Warsaw, to the Crimean War and the Russo-Japanese War.

“However, the country’s vast interior has always remained an extensive, secure hinterland. As a character in a satirical play by the Ukrainian-born writer Nikolai Gogol said in the first half of the nineteenth century: ‘From here, you could ride on horseback for three years and not reach another country.’”

According to Lukashevsky, anyone who penetrated deep into Russia almost inevitably encountered insurmountable logistical problems and ultimately suffered defeat, a lesson learned by Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon and Hitler alike.

Ukraine has largely avoided these dangers by striking Russia’s rear areas from a distance.